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THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY IN
PROTECTING (AND IMPAIRING)
SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS: INCENTIVES
AND DISINCENTIVES TO MAXIMIZE
CORPORATE WEALTH
JEFFREY MICHAEL SMITH
“For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics.” 1
INTRODUCTION
In December 1993, an attorney for James Bird informed the
board of directors of Lida, Inc. that the corporation was involved in
disadvantageous lease agreements with its controlling shareholders.2
As a noncontrolling stockholder of Lida,3 Bird was unhappy with the
lease agreements, which enriched the controlling shareholders at the
expense of the corporation and the other shareholders.  Bird pre-
sented his information to the board of directors of Lida, and made a
demand for investigation.4  The board subsequently appointed a spe-
cial committee, which retained independent real estate appraisal
firms.5  Acting on a report from this committee, the board of direc-
tors renegotiated the leases in the corporation’s favor.6
The renegotiation of the leases, instigated as a result of Bird’s
demand, will save Lida over $680,000.7  Lida’s shareholders as a
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JUSTICE HOLMES 391, 399 (1995).  Holmes delivered this address at Boston University on
January 8, 1897.  See id. at 391.
2. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 401 (Del. Ch. 1996).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 401-02.
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group will receive a substantial benefit, but James Bird, being only
one of many shareholders, will realize just a small portion of that
benefit.  His attorney will receive none of the benefit.  It was Bird
and his attorney, however, who bore the costs of investigating the
corporation, discovering the inefficiency, and bringing it to the atten-
tion of the board of directors.  Bird and his attorney expended re-
sources in a way that created “a substantial quantifiable financial
benefit to the corporation.”8  Nevertheless, under current law, the
people responsible for this increase of wealth are not entitled to
share in it.
There is, however, another side to plaintiffs’ attorneys; they do
not always create wealth.  In fact, attorneys often bring meritless de-
rivative suits against corporations just to extort a settlement.9  All too
often, this technique is successful; empirical studies and practical ex-
perience have led to a growing consensus among judges and academ-
ics that shareholder litigation is open to abuse by plaintiffs and their
attorneys to a greater extent than are other fields of civil litigation.10
Among shareholder suits, derivative suits are the most likely to be
frivolous.11
Plaintiffs’ attorneys are the controlling force in shareholder liti-
gation,12 and like most other actors in the economy, including corpo-
rate managers and shareholders, they are often motivated by the
prospect of personal financial gain or loss. There is nothing necessar-
ily wrong with this motivation; indeed, it’s the motivation we have
come to expect, and at times even revere, in our capitalist system.
However, unlike in private sector markets where the “invisible hand”
8. Id. at 403.
9. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
10. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 368 (1994); Reinier Kraakman et al., When
are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1736 (1994); see also Ralph
K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the
Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 949 (1993) (noting that a large percentage of
shareholder claims are frivolous and are based on settlement value instead of merit); Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84
(1991) (observing that in most derivative suits, plaintiffs’ attorneys benefit more than their cli-
ents, who usually receive only “minimal compensation”).
11. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and Beyond: The Role of State
Courts in Class Actions Invoking Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 219, 283 n.73
(citing Romano, supra note 10, at 55) (concluding that derivative suits are more likely to be
frivolous than the other type of shareholder litigation, shareholder class actions).
12. See infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
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turns individual avarice into societal wealth,13 in the legal system poli-
cymakers must take care to craft rules that turn attorneys’ self-
interest into wealth-maximizing behavior.  We must create incentives
that reward efficient, wealth-creating activities and deter inefficient,
wealth-destroying activities.
Part I.A of this Note discusses the differing incentives between
managers and shareholders and explains why managers do not always
act in the best interests of the shareholders.  Part I.B describes incen-
tives that American law has developed to motivate shareholders and
their attorneys to take action against certain types of inefficient man-
agement action.14  Part II discusses the legal debate over the Bird v.
Lida situation, described above, in which the shareholder and his at-
torney expend resources, make a demand on the corporation, and
create a benefit for the collective shareholders, but do not actually
file suit.  Finally, Part III suggests two proposals: the first would give
plaintiffs’ attorneys further incentive to act in wealth-creating ways,
while the second would deter plaintiffs’ attorneys from engaging in
wealth-destroying behavior.
I. SHAREHOLDER OVERSIGHT OF CORPORATIONS
Although there are many corporations that have only a small
number of shareholders, the nation’s giant corporations, which gen-
erally have a large number of shareholders, play a particularly signifi-
cant role in the economy.15  It is estimated that the nation’s 500 larg-
est corporations control 75% of the United States’ industrial assets
and are responsible for 75% of the country’s new investment.16  Since
such a large percentage of the nation’s assets are controlled by corpo-
rations, society has a substantial interest in the efficient operation of
these corporations; society benefits when corporations use these as-
13. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford
University Press 1976) (1776) (describing how when an individual labors in the economy,
though “he intends only his own gain,” he is “led by an invisible hand” to promote the eco-
nomic interests of society).
14. While this Note discusses general corporate law common to most American jurisdic-
tions, it focuses on the corporate law of Delaware, “the dominant corporation law state.”
Glenn G. Morris, Shareholder Derivative Suits: Louisiana Law, 56 LA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1996);
see also WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 125 (7th ed. 1995) (noting that Delaware is “the leading jurisdiction for pub-
licly held corporations”).
15. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 243.
16. See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC
ECONOMY 117 (1987).
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sets in the most efficient manner.17
A. Differing incentives between managers and shareholders
The interests of corporate shareholders are aligned with the in-
terests of society; the corporation that acts efficiently will maximize
the company’s value and thus maximize the value of each share-
holder’s stock.18  Shareholders, however, do not run corporations; di-
rectors and managers do,19 and their interests do not always coincide
with shareholders’ interests.20  Several factors contribute to this di-
vergence of interest.  First, while managers generally own stock in the
firm that they manage,21 they typically own only a small portion of the
company, and as such receive only a small percentage of any wealth
that their decisions create.22  Thus, they may not have sufficient in-
centive to fully use their intellectual capital and labor in the service
of the firm.  Second, managers are often motivated as much, if not
more, by desires for personal power and prestige, as they are by the
goal of profit maximization.23  Third, and perhaps most importantly,
17. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 7 (1991) (“[W]hat is optimal for the [publicly held] firms and investors is
optimal for society.”).  The term “efficiency” refers to the use of resources in a way that maxi-
mizes their value.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992).
18. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 30 (1976)
(“[A] shareholder’s objective is that the corporation maximize its per-share earnings.”).
19. See Abrams v. Koether, 766 F. Supp. 237, 249 (D.N.J. 1991) (“Under Delaware law,
the directors of a corporation, not the shareholders, manage the business and affairs of a corpo-
ration.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he business and affairs of a
Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board of directors.”); see also CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 242 (“Where shareholdership is highly dispersed [among many
shareholders], the corporation will be controlled not by the shareholders, but by manage-
ment . . . .”) (discussing ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)).
20. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 91.  Of course, directors and manag-
ers are supposed to subjugate their own interest to the interests of the shareholders.  See Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).  However, “[m]any decisions [made
by corporate managers] appear to be motivated more by self-interest than by concern for
shareholders or even other constituencies.  Other decisions appear to be the result of sheer in-
competence or inefficiency.”  Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as a Means of Increasing Share-
holder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little, But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U.  L.
REV. 379, 414 (1994).
21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1986).
22. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (1991).
23. See EISENBERG, supra note 18, at 31.
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managers are “overinvested” in a single corporation (the one they
manage) while shareholders are “diversified.”24  Shareholders can,
and almost always do, invest in a cross-section of securities, including
the stocks of numerous corporations.25  This allows them to reduce
their overall risk (the variance of possible returns on their portfolio)
without reducing their expected return.26  This is desirable to them
because people are generally risk averse, preferring a lower variance
in returns to a higher variance.27
Managers, however, cannot diversify their “portfolios” for three
reasons.  First, managers typically receive, as part of their compensa-
tion, stock and/or stock options that they are not allowed to sell.28
Second, managers are potentially subject to unlimited personal liabil-
ity in lawsuits based upon their management, while a shareholder’s
liability is limited to his investment in the company.29  Finally, a man-
ager’s most important “asset” is his job, and this is with only one
company.30
This overinvestment causes managers to be primarily concerned
with the performance of their firm.  Managers, like other people, are
risk averse;31 thus, they are more concerned with minimizing risk, par-
ticularly the risk of bankruptcy, than with profit maximization.32
Shareholders, with their diversified portfolios, do not particularly
care about the performance of a single firm; instead, they care about
the performance of the overall economy and the stock market.33
Shareholders will thus prefer a high risk-high return strategy to a low
risk-low return one, since they are essentially risk-neutral with regard
to each individual firm.34
24. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 16-20; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 28-29.
25. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 28-30.
26. See FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 101-04 (2d ed. 1989) (“Diversification is almost always beneficial to the risk-averse
investor since it reduces risk unless returns on securities move perfectly together (which is an
extremely rare occurrence).”).
27. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 29-30; MISHKIN, supra note 26, at
101.
28. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 18.
29. See id.
30. See id.; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 17.
31. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 30.
32. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 19 (“Because the manager cannot spread his risks, or es-
cape them safely in the event of insolvency, he is economically wedded to his firm.”).
33. See id. (“Once a shareholder has diversified his portfolio, he is in theory largely im-
mune from firm-specific risk . . . .”).
34. See id.
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B. Combating the Collective Action Problem: Current Law
The collective shareholders have a financial interest in monitor-
ing management and taking action when managers act dishonestly or
inefficiently.  However, monitoring the corporation and taking action
against managers costs money.35  Although the shareholders as a
group will often benefit substantially from such outlays,36 each indi-
vidual shareholder will get only a small piece of the benefit.  This
creates a collective action problem:37 No shareholder has an incentive
to engage in activity that would benefit the collectivity, and bear the
full costs of such activity when the benefits will be scattered among
all of the shareholders.38
One tool crafted to encourage attorneys to alleviate this collec-
tive action problem is the derivative suit.39  Derivative suits are used
mainly to sue corporate officers and directors for breaches of the fi-
duciary duties that managers and directors owe to the corporation.40
When managers or directors have breached their duty to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, a single shareholder can stand derivatively
in the corporation’s shoes and sue the delinquent individuals.41  The
claim continues to be owned by the corporation, but the shareholder
files and manages the lawsuit.42  If the suit is successful, the corpora-
tion (thus the collective shareholders), receives the monetary recov-
35. See, e.g., Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the expendi-
ture of resources which led to a benefit for the corporation).
36. See, e.g., id. at 401-02 (stating that the corporation saved in excess of $680,000 (in 1996
dollars) as a result of a shareholder’s action).
37. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 10.
38. For further discussion of the collective action problem, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS  (2d ed. 1971).
39. The United States Supreme Court has described the derivative suit as the “chief regu-
lator of corporate management.”  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548
(1949).  Commentators have noted that a derivative suit can increase corporate value in two
ways: the prospect of a derivative suit may deter misconduct, and the suit itself may yield posi-
tive recovery for the corporation even after subtracting all costs that the corporation incurs as a
result of the suit.  See Kraakman et al., supra note 10, at 1736.
40. See Morris, supra note 14, at 584.  A fiduciary duty is a “duty to act for someone else’s
benefit, while subordinating one’s personal interests to that of the other person.  It is the high-
est standard of duty implied by law.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990).  Types of
breaches of fiduciary duty include “grossly negligent mismanagement, waste of corporate as-
sets, excessive compensation, usurpation of corporate opportunity, and . . . general self-
dealing.”  Brandi, supra note 10, at 360.
41. See Morris, supra note 14, at 584.
42. See id.
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ery.43  The shareholder who brings suit, however, is entitled to have
his attorney’s fees paid by the corporation.44  Thus, both the costs and
benefits of the action are shared by the whole group.  The derivative
suit solves the collective action problem in some circumstances be-
cause a single shareholder and his attorney can recover money for the
collective shareholders (through the corporation), and have their
costs, including the attorney’s fees, offset by that same group of col-
lective shareholders (again, through the corporation). The derivative
suit makes it profitable for shareholders’ attorneys to act against cer-
tain types of inefficient activity undertaken by corporate managers.
In Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners,45 the Delaware Supreme
Court expanded the principle behind the derivative suit by awarding
attorney’s fees to Initio Partners, a shareholder-plaintiff who had
sued on its own behalf rather than in the form of a derivative suit.
Initio Partners was the largest single shareholder of Tandycrafts.46
Tandycrafts’ management, apparently fearful of a takeover by Initio
Partners, proposed to its shareholders an amendment to the corpo-
rate charter that would have imposed an 80% supermajority voting
requirement for any takeover not approved by the directors.47  Initio
Partners filed suit against Tandycrafts, alleging that the proxy mate-
rial issued by Tandycrafts’ management was materially misleading.48
Initio Partners alleged, inter alia, that the proxy material was defi-
cient because it failed to mention that Tandycrafts’ management
owned 7.5% of the stock, and the company’s employee benefit plan
owned 10.9%.49  Initio Partners argued that the management’s control
of 18.4% of the stock made the attainment of an 80% supermajority
against the wishes of management virtually impossible.50
43. See id. at 589-90; Mary Elizabeth Matthews, Derivative Suits and the Similarly Situated
Shareholder Requirement, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1, 1 (1995).
44. See Morris, supra note 14, at 590.  If the plaintiff loses, he does not get reimbursed for
his legal fees.  This is not generally a problem for the shareholder, however, because these
cases are usually brought on a contingency fee basis.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 678 (1986).  This means that if
the plaintiff loses the suit, his attorney gets nothing, not even reimbursement for the expenses
of the litigation.  See id.
45. 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989).
46. See id. at 1163.  Initio Partners owned 9.9% of Tandycrafts’ common stock.  See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
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While discovery on the suit was proceeding, Tandycrafts issued a
supplement to its proxy statement that included a disclosure of the
combined holdings of the managers and the employee benefit plan.51
Despite the clarifications, Initio Partners maintained its position that
an injunction should be issued barring a shareholder vote on the
amendments.52  Initio Partner’s request was denied, the vote was held,
and the proposal was “soundly defeated.”53  Having achieved its ob-
jective, Initio Partners filed a motion to dismiss its lawsuit and an ap-
plication for attorney’s fees of $180,000 to be assessed against Tandy-
crafts.54
Tandycrafts argued that a shareholder-plaintiff should not be
allowed to recover attorneys’ fees from the corporation when it sues
for its own benefit and not on behalf of a class or derivatively on be-
half of the corporation.55  The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
argument.56  Noting that attorney fee-shifting is a flexible concept
based on the historic equity power of the Court of Chancery,57 the
court held that, “under certain circumstances, counsel fees may be
awarded to an individual shareholder whose litigation effort confers a
benefit upon the corporation, or its shareholders, notwithstanding the
absence of a class or derivative component,” and awarded the fees.58
The legal principle set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Tandycrafts is significant.  The Delaware Supreme Court ruled that
courts should ascertain whether a benefit was conferred upon the
larger shareholder group when determining the propriety of fee-
shifting.59  In holding that “the critical inquiry is not the status of the
plaintiff but the nature of the corporate or class benefit which is
51. See id. at 1163-64.
52. See id. at 1164.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.  Tandycrafts also argued that there was no causal connection between Initio
Partners’ suit and the supplementary material issued by Tandycrafts.  See id.  In fact, there
were two causal issues: whether Initio’s suit caused Tandycrafts to issue the supplement, and
whether the issuance of the supplement caused the proposed amendments to fail.  For a discus-
sion of causation and where the burden of proof should be placed for an assessment of attor-
ney’s fees, see infra Part III.A.1.
56. See Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1165.
57. See id. at 1166.
58. Id. at 1163.  The court set out three requirements that must have been met for a peti-
tioning plaintiff to be awarded attorney’s fees: “(a) the claim was meritorious when filed; (b)
the action was benefiting the corporation; . . . and (c) the benefit was causally related to the
lawsuit.”  Id. at 1167.
59. See Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1163.
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causally related to the filing of suit,”60 the court rejected formalism in
favor of spreading the costs of the lawsuit among the shareholders
whom the court found had benefited from the suit.  While reaction to
this holding has been mixed,61 the rule set forth in Tandycrafts is
sound.  By allowing the shareholder-plaintiff to spread the costs to
those who received the benefit, the court created another tool to deal
with the collective action problem, and it gave shareholders and their
attorneys greater incentive to monitor corporate management and
prevent inefficient behavior.
II. THE NO SUIT-NO FEE RECOVERY DEBATE
As described in Part I.B, Delaware law allows a shareholder to
recover his legal expenses when he and his attorney confer a benefit
on the corporation through a lawsuit.  In Bird v. Lida, Inc,62 however,
Bird and his attorney conferred a benefit on the corporation without
filing a lawsuit.63  After acquiring information on the corporation’s
leases, Bird and his attorney made a demand on the corporation.64
Such a demand is required under Delaware law before a derivative
suit can be filed.65  Once Lida received Bird’s demand and the ac-
companying information, it remedied the problem, creating value for
the corporation.66  Bird and his attorney, however, had personally in-
curred the costs that led to that gain.  Bird filed suit to recover his
60. Id. at 1166.
61. Compare Scott R. Haiber, Note, Derogating the Derivative: Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio
Partners and the Role of Attorneys’ Fees in Shareholder Litigation, 3 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 213,
214 (1990) (contending that “the holding [of Tandycrafts] inadvertently undermines the careful
procedural balance constructed around the derivative suit”), with Recent Case, Attorneys’
Fees—Substantial Benefit Doctrine—Delaware Supreme Court Grants Fees to Plaintiff Suing as
an Individual Shareholder—Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989), 103
HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1187-88, 1192 (1990) (arguing that the court’s “decision to force unrepre-
sented shareholders to pay legal fees, although at first surprising, makes sense.  The sharehold-
ers who benefited from the plaintiff’s efforts should bear a portion of the plaintiff’s expenses in
bringing the suit.”).
62. 681 A.2d 399 (Del. Ch. 1996).  For a discussion of the facts of this case, see supra notes
2-8 and accompanying text.
63. See 681 A.2d at 402-05.
64. See id. at 401.
65. See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.  The demand requirement is strictly enforced by Delaware
courts.  See Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d 353, 357 (Del. Ch. 1983).  Most other states have similar
requirements, see Brandi, supra note 10, at 373, as do the federal courts, see FED. R. CIV. P.
23.1.
66. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 401-02.
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costs,67 presenting the issue of whether a shareholder can recover le-
gal expenses incurred when a benefit is conferred on the corporation
but no lawsuit is filed.68
A. Prior Case Law
The issue presented in Lida had been addressed in Foley v. Santa
Fe Pacific Corp.69  In Foley, an Illinois court applied Delaware law in
deciding whether attorneys’ fees could be awarded in the absence of
a suit.70  While it noted that Delaware cases had allowed for recovery
of attorneys’ fees where the underlying lawsuit was settled or ren-
dered moot,71 the court held that, under Delaware law, no recovery
can be granted in a case where no suit has been filed.72  The Foley
court based its decision on Delaware case law; it offered no policy ra-
tionale for denying recovery in situations in which no suit was filed.
The Southern District of New York addressed the same issue in
Kaufman Malchman & Kirby, P.C. v. Hasbro, Inc.73  In that case,
Darren Suprina, a shareholder of Hasbro, a Rhode Island Corpora-
tion, had demanded, through his attorneys, Kaufman Malchman &
Kirby, P.C. (KMK), that Hasbro stop paying royalties on expired
patents.74  After initial hesitation, Hasbro’s board of directors decided
to substantially comply with Suprina’s request.75  KMK then com-
menced suit seeking fees for its representation of Suprina.76
The court ruled that where no lawsuit had been filed, a plaintiff
is categorically denied from recovering his expenses under either
Rhode Island or New York law.77  As a matter of law, the court’s
67. See id. at 402.
68. While Bird did eventually file a lawsuit seeking recovery of his costs, the corporate
benefit had already been conferred as a result of his initial demand on the corporation.
69. 641 N.E.2d 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
70. See id. at 996.
71. See id. (citing Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162 (Del. 1989); Sugar-
land Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980)).
72. See id.
73. 897 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
74. See id. at 720.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 721-24.  The court declined to determine whether New York or Rhode Island
law governed, finding that the result under either would be the same.  See id. at 722.  The plain-
tiff had argued, unsuccessfully, that federal law should apply because patents are created and
governed by federal law.  See id. at 720-21.  This is an interesting argument, as the plaintiff had
initially filed the suit in a state court, and it was the defendant who removed the suit to federal
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ruling was probably correct.  Federal courts sitting in diversity cases
must apply the substantive statutory and case law of the forum state.78
If the law of the forum state is unclear, a federal court must predict
how the highest court of that state would resolve the issue.79  It is very
unlikely that either the Rhode Island Supreme Court or the New
York Court of Appeals would have awarded the fees sought by
KMK.80  Rhode Island statutory law is silent on the issue and the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has consistently found that costs will
not be awarded unless authorized by a statute or contract.81  New
York permits recovery where “the action on behalf of the corpora-
tion was successful, in whole or in part, or if anything was received by
the . . . claimant . . . as the result of a judgment, compromise or set-
tlement of an action or claim.”82  The issue for the courts is whether
making a demand without filing a lawsuit constitutes an “action” un-
der that statute.83  In 1962, a New York court held that it does not: “It
would be unwise to authorize compensation to counsel for a stock-
holder whenever management took action beneficial to the corpora-
tion as a result of a request or demand by a stockholder.”84
Unlike the court in Foley, the Hasbro court offered policy argu-
ments to support the position that fee recovery should not be allowed
when no suit has been filed.85  The court argued that if there were no
filing requirement, “shareholders could bring frivolous lawsuits
merely to accrue attorneys’ fees or to force the company to enter into
clandestine settlements,”86 and concluded that “allowing shareholders
to recover attorneys’ fees for making a demand would defeat the
court.  See id. at 720 n.1.  State courts do not have jurisdiction over cases arising under the fed-
eral patent laws.  See id. at 721.
78. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
79. See id.; see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that the court would rule based upon a prediction of how the New York Court of Ap-
peals would resolve the issues).
80. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 722-24.
81. See id. (citing Eleazer v. Ted Reed Thermal, Inc., 576 A.2d 1217, 1221 (R.I. 1990);
Newport Yacht Management, Inc. v. Clark, 567 A.2d 364, 366-67 (R.I. 1989)). Rhode Island
does not even allow fee recovery for plaintiffs in derivative suits.  See id. at 722.
82. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1986).
83. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 723.
84. Ripley v. International Rys., 227 N.Y.S.2d 64, 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962), aff’d, 187
N.E.2d 131 (N.Y. 1962).
85. See Hasbro, 897 F. Supp. at 723-24.
86. Id. at 724 (citing Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 346 (N.Y. 1954); Shapiro v.
Magaziner, 210 A.2d 890, 894 (Pa. 1965)).
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purpose of the [demand] requirement.”87
The court’s concerns, however, are misplaced.  If recovery were
based on the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that the corporation benefited
from the action, frivolous lawsuits or demands would not increase,
because frivolous demands, by definition, do not confer a benefit on
the corporation.  Furthermore, allowing a shareholder to recover his
expenses when he has conferred a benefit on the corporation would
strengthen, not defeat the demand requirement.  Under the system
defended by the court, a shareholder or shareholder’s attorney has an
incentive to share as little information as possible when he makes his
demand because he can only recover his legal fees if the corporation
does not meet his demand and he is able to file a lawsuit.  If recovery
was based upon whether a benefit was conferred rather than upon
the technical status of the shareholder’s claim, the shareholder would
have greater incentive to fully inform the corporation at the demand
stage and less incentive to go to court.
B. Bird v. Lida, Inc.
A somewhat different result was reached when a Delaware judge
interpreted Delaware law in Bird v. Lida, Inc.88  In Lida, Chancellor
Allen found that a shareholder who confers a benefit on a corpora-
tion without filing suit can sometimes be awarded attorneys’ fees.
Allen acknowledged the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement that
fee-shifting should occur only if “the claim was meritorious when
filed,”89 but argued that to rely on the phrase “when filed” would be
to engage in “stunted literalism.”90  Allen chose instead to emphasize
the word “meritorious,” stating that “[t]he ‘when filed’ restriction is
intended, I suppose, to preclude fee awards in cases that do not have
‘merit’ . . . when filed, even if discovery later shows the existence of a
litigable and settleable case.  Thus the ‘when filed’ term means to dis-
courage derivative suits brought as a ‘fishing expedition.’”91  Allen
concluded that this purpose was irrelevant to the issue in Lida.92
After determining that Tandycrafts did not preclude an award to
87. Id.
88. 681 A.2d 399 (Del. Ch. 1996).  For a discussion of the facts of Lida, see supra notes 2-8
and accompanying text.
89. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. 1989).
90. Lida, 681 A.2d at 404-05.
91. Id. at 405.
92. See id.
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James Bird of his legal expenses, Chancellor Allen turned to Kauf-
man v. Shoenberg,93 a 1952 Court of Chancery case.  In Kaufman,
then-Chancellor Seitz94 held that “a stockholder is entitled to his rea-
sonable investigation fees if his demand produces some real benefit
to the Corporation without the necessity for litigation.”95  Although
Kaufman was not direct precedent because in that case a suit had
been filed,96 Chancellor Allen found this factual distinction to be ir-
relevant.  He held that Kaufman required him to recognize a share-
holder’s right to recover investigation fees including attorney’s fees,
in connection with the making of a demand pursuant to Delaware
Chancery Court Rule 23.197 under certain circumstances.98  Allen but-
tressed his legal conclusion with policy arguments99 concluding,
among other things, that Bird’s demand, which led to a nearly
$700,000 gain for the collective shareholders, appeared to be “the
sort of activity that rational shareholders would encourage and would
agree to reimburse [if] they had the relevant information ex ante.”100
Chancellor Allen’s “economic analysis” led him to recognize “a
powerful argument in favor of” reimbursement of expenses by a
shareholder whose “meritorious” demand has led to a quantifiable
benefit for the corporation.101  Nevertheless, James Bird did not pre-
vail.  Theory and practice convinced Allen to reject one arbitrary
technical rule: that the presence or absence of a filed suit would de-
93. 92 A.2d 295 (Del. Ch. 1952).
94. Collins Seitz later served as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
95. Kaufman, 92 A.2d at 295.
96. See id.  As in Tandycrafts, the suit in Kaufman was dismissed before the litigation
could be completed.  See id.  For further discussion of the facts of Kaufman, see Kaufman v.
Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 788-90, 793-94 (Del. Ch. 1952) (holding that in a shareholder action to
enjoin a corporation from implementing a stock option plan for key employees, the agreement
of employees, to whom options were given, that they would remain in employment for two
years constituted legal consideration for the grant of the options).
97. For a discussion of the importance of Rule 23.1, see supra note 65 and accompanying
text.
98. See Bird v. Lida, Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 405 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Those circumstances are:
at least (1) the presentation of a meritorious corporate claim by a shareholder, (2)
the expenditure of funds or credit by the shareholder in investigating such claim, (3)
action by the board that confers a quantifiable financial benefit on the corporation,
(4) which action is causally related to the making of the shareholder demand.
Id.
99. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 402-05 (arguing that awarding fees in this context would reward
behavior that is beneficial to shareholders without encouraging “frivolous” demands).
100. Id. at 403.
101. Id.
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termine whether a shareholder could recover his costs.102  However,
refusing to allow economic analysis to take him too far from tradi-
tional legal analysis,103 Allen instituted another arbitrary technical
rule: that a shareholder can only recover costs if he makes a
“meritorious” corporate claim in the Rule 23.1 demand.104  To be in-
demnified for his costs under Chancellor Allen’s rule, James Bird’s
demand would have to “involve not simply a claim of business subop-
timization, but a ‘meritorious’ claim of legal (including equitable)
wrong.”105  Under Delaware law, a claim is only meritorious if the
plaintiff can prove facts that give him a reasonable chance of pre-
vailing at trial.106  If the court is convinced that the shareholder pre-
senting the demand would not have been able to compel the corpora-
tion to capitulate to the demand in a lawsuit, the shareholder cannot
recover expenses, regardless of the economic benefit his actions may
have conferred upon the corporation.
Chancellor Allen found that if James Bird’s demand had been
disregarded by Lida and Bird had filed a lawsuit, his suit would not
have been meritorious because the “unreasonable” leases of which
Bird complained were entered into before Bird or any other public
shareholder acquired stock.107  No public shareholder had actually
been wronged by the leases,108 because the market price of the stock
when the public shareholders bought it reflected the unfair leases.109
Thus, the $680,000 gained by the corporation as a result of Bird’s
demand were windfall profits to the shareholders.  It is ironic that if
102. See id. at 404-05.
103. See id.  Allen reasoned:
The law comprises more than the determination of contested facts and the unmedi-
ated application of principles of economic efficiency . . . .  While notions of economic
efficiency will appropriately play a role in the myriad instances in which common-law
courts shape the law interstially [sic], case by case, courts do tend to look . . . to con-
cerns more directly affecting legal values.  Thus, courts are primarily concerned with
legal values such as procedural fairness; fidelity to authoritative pronouncements of
substantive law; the application of a professionally defined canon of construction
techniques to produce legal meanings; and the acceptance of an established hierar-
chy of authority. . . . [I]t is not satisfactory for a court to begin and end its analysis of
a legal problem with . . . economic analysis . . . .
Id. at 403.
104. See id. at 405-06.
105. Id. at 406.
106. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966).
107. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 406.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 406 n.4 (“[T]he market priced what the buyer was buying, warts and all.  It
would be neither fair nor efficient to permit later complaints about a disclosed wart.”).
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the shareholders had been entitled to the $680,000,110 they would have
had to pay Bird’s expenses.  However, because they were not legally
entitled to the $680,000, they received it for free.  Under the rule of
Bird v. Lida, Inc., shareholders must pay for what they are entitled
to, but they do not have to pay for undeserved gains.
As Chancellor Allen seems to realize, economic analysis does
not justify this distinction.111  However, Allen balanced economic effi-
ciency against “certain legal institutional concerns.”112  He argued
that awarding fees for a “meritorious” demand was only a “small
step” from fee-shifting in litigation, and one that was required by
Kaufman, while awarding fees for a nonmeritorious demand that
confers the same benefit upon the corporation was a “larger step.”113
While Allen conceded that this “larger step” “would certainly be ra-
tional,” he concluded that it was not sufficiently “supported by ex-
isting legal authorities to warrant judicial adoption at this time.”114
It is not clear how Chancellor Allen can read Kaufman as com-
pelling precedent for his “small step,” but not for the “larger step.”
Chancellor Seitz did not address the issue of “merit” in his eight sen-
tence opinion in Kaufman.  To Seitz, the issue was “whether, as a
matter of law, a stockholder is entitled to his reasonable investigation
fees if his demand produces some real benefit to the Corporation
without the necessity for litigation.”115  Seitz held that a stockholder is
entitled to such fees if he can prove that his demand produced a
benefit for the corporation.116  Seitz extended recovery in this way be-
cause, “substantially the same benefit accrues to the Corporation
whether it be as the result of the demand or of successful litiga-
110. That is, had they been wrongfully deprived of the money by the directors and then got-
ten it as the result of a “meritorious” demand.
111. See Lida, 681 A.2d at 407.  Specifically, Chancellor Allen stated:
[I]f we appreciate the collective action problem of shareholders and the neat solution
to the collective action problem that paying a bounty to successful shareholders[’]
lawyers represents, why should the law care whether Mr. Bird conferred a benefit
through a meritorious legal claim or through stimulating the board simply to act in a
way he correctly thought was advantageous?  In either event the collective action
problem of shareholders was overcome and a substantial financial benefit was
realized by the corporate collectivity.
Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 92 A.2d 295, 295 (Del. Ch. 1952).
116. See id.
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tion.”117  Since Bird and his attorney produced a “real benefit” of over
$680,000 for the corporation, the logic, as well as the language, of
Kaufman would seem to counsel in favor of recovery for James Bird.
III. PROPOSALS
In our adversarial system, attorneys are expected to be loyal ad-
vocates, zealously carrying out their clients’ wishes.118  Plaintiffs’ at-
torneys in shareholder suits, however, do not fulfill this role.119  In
shareholder litigation, the attorney usually represents all the share-
holders of a given corporation (class action) or the corporation itself
(derivative suit).120  In such cases, the attorney is almost always the
driving force behind the litigation.121  The attorney is an entrepreneur,
seeking opportunities to increase his personal wealth.122  He will gen-
erally find a promising suit first and then look for a “client” to allow
him to bring the suit.123  Once the suit has commenced, the attorney
remains the decisionmaker, with the client serving as a mere figure-
head.124  The decisions made by the entrepreneur-attorney, both be-
117. Id.
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1992) (“A lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . and shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.  A lawyer shall abide by a cli-
ent’s decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”); Coffee, supra note 44, at
677.
119. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 3.
120. See id. at 9-11.  There are some cases where an attorney represents a single plaintiff in
a shareholder suit.  See, e.g., Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Del.
1989) (recognizing as the plaintiff a corporation that was the largest single stockholder in the
defendant corporation).
121. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 7-8 (noting that plaintiffs’ attorneys in share-
holder suits “are not subject to monitoring by their putative clients, [and thus] they operate
largely according to their own self-interest”); Coffee, supra note 44, at 677-79 (discussing evi-
dence that class actions and derivative suits are generally attorney-motivated).
122. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 3.
123. See Coffee, supra note 44, at 679 (describing the plaintiffs’ attorney as a “bounty
hunter” who is “motivated to prosecute legal violations still unknown to prospective clients”).
Both class action and derivative suits require nominal plaintiffs, see Macey & Miller, supra note
22, at 5; however, “identifying and securing a nominal plaintiff is often only a necessary proce-
dural step that seldom poses a substantial barrier,”  Coffee, supra note 44, at 682.
124. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 5; see also Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,
1144 (11th Cir. 1985) (reprimanding the plaintiffs’ attorneys for not serving the interests of all
their clients); Foster v. Boise-Cascade, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 674, 681, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
(recognizing the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ incentive to settle a case when settlement is not necessar-
ily in the best interests of the clients and rejecting the attorneys’ fee of $12,000, arrived at in a
settlement with the defendant-corporation, as unreasonable), aff’d, 577 F.2d 335 (5th Cir.
1978).
SMITHPP.DOC 03/31/98  2:06 PM
1997] PROTECTING SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS 177
fore and after the suit has been filed, reflect the attorney’s own inter-
ests and not those of the client.125  Because the plaintiffs’ attorney
controls the litigation, it is necessary to align the incentives of plain-
tiffs’ attorneys with those of general wealth maximization.126
A. Recovery for a Benefit Conferred
1. A New Question for Courts.  The question that should be ask-
ed in fee recovery cases is: “Was a benefit conferred upon the
corporation as a result of costs borne by the shareholder and his
attorney?”  If the answer is “yes,” then the corporation should be
required to compensate the shareholder for his costs, including legal
fees.127  Courts should be directed to focus on economic solutions such
125. See Macey & Miller, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that “the plaintiff’s attorney—not the
client—controls the litigation”).
126. See id. at 3-4.
127. Fee recovery should be granted only if the benefit to the corporation exceeds the fees
generated by the shareholder.  If the fees are greater than the benefits, the action was not effi-
cient, and should not be rewarded or encouraged.  While this point may seem obvious, at least
one court, acting in a class action setting, has allowed plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect fees far in
excess of the benefit that they created.  In Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., Judge Frank
Easterbrook discussed a class action suit in which an Alabama state court had allowed a set-
tlement that granted the plaintiff’s attorneys more money than was recovered from the defen-
dants:
A class action contending that the Bank of Boston and its affiliates (collectively, the
Bank) did not promptly post interest to real estate escrow accounts was filed in Ala-
bama by a Chicago law firm.  Settlement ensued, and the class members learned only
what the notice told them.  Few opted out or objected, because the maximum award
to any class member was less than $9.  Any recovery, however small, seemed prefer-
able to initiating a separate suit or even bearing the costs of protesting the settle-
ment’s terms.  After the state judge approved the pact, the Bank carried out its part:
it disbursed more than $8 million to the class attorneys in legal fees and credited
most accounts with paltry sums.  Problem: the [legal] fees, equal to 5.32 percent of
the balance in each account, were debited to the accounts.  For many accounts the
debit exceeded the credit.  Dexter J. Kamilewicz, for example, received a credit of
$2.19 and a debit of $91.33, for a loss of $89.14.
100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted) (denying a petition for a rehearing en
banc of Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996)) (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting).  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to set aside this
result because it found that it did not have jurisdiction.  See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 509.  This
was because federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, do not have jurisdiction to review
decisions of state courts.  See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923); Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d
845, 849 (7th Cir. 1995).
While the outcome of Kamilewicz is unjust, such an outcome in the derivative suit or
shareholder demand context would be even more egregious because, unlike in the class action
context, there would be no right to “opt out.”  For further discussion of questionable settle-
ments of shareholder suits, see Brandi, supra note 10, at 392 (stating that “courts quite often
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as giving shareholders and attorneys the incentive to solve the
collective action problem, rather than technicalities such as whether a
suit was classified as a derivative or individual suit,128 whether a suit
was filed or merely threatened,129 or whether the benefit resulted
from “righting a wrong” or simply increasing efficiency.130  If a
shareholder can prove that his action, which entailed costs such as
attorneys’ fees, created a benefit for the corporation, then he should
be indemnified by the corporation.
This would place a two-part burden of proof on the shareholder
and his attorney.  First, they would have to prove the existence of a
benefit to the corporation.  Second, they would have to prove that
their actions caused that benefit.  Placing this burden of proof on the
shareholder is a departure from the present law governing fee-
shifting after a derivative suit is filed.  Under current law, “[o]nce it is
determined that action benefiting the corporation chronologically
followed the filing of a meritorious suit, the burden is upon the corpo-
ration to demonstrate ‘that the lawsuit did not in any way cause [its]
action.’”131 However, placing the burden on the corporation to prove
that the corporate benefit did not result from the demand might en-
courage plaintiffs’ attorneys to demand that a corporation undertake
an action the corporation had already planned to take in the hope
that the corporation would not be able to prove its prior intention.
Furthermore, in light of the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court
has held that noneconomic benefits, such as changes in corporate
policy or increased corporate disclosure, can justify an award of at-
torneys’ fees,132 it would be virtually impossible, in many cases, for a
corporation to prove that a specific noneconomic change did not con-
fer a benefit on the corporation.  This would result in shareholders
being rewarded for actions that created change but did not actually
benefit the corporation,133 and were thus not efficient actions.  Placing
approve settlements that involve only cosmetic procedural relief for the shareholders but at the
same time grant high attorney fees” (footnote omitted)); Romano, supra note 10, at 84; John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 26-33.
128. See supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Part II.
130. See supra notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
131. Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Del. 1989) (quoting Allied
Artists Picture Corp. v. Baron, 413 A.2d 876, 880 (Del. 1980)) (emphasis added).
132. See id. at 1164-65; see also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 386 (Del. 1966).
133. One quarter of shareholder settlements result in structural relief.  See Romano, supra
note 10, at 84.  In most of these cases, the changes are merely cosmetic.  See id.  It seems likely
